Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal
Volume 9
Number 2 Summer 2017

Article 1

Summer 2017

Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A
Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and
Regulators
Shawn Bayern
Thomas Burri
Thomas D. Grant
Daniel M. Häusermann
Florian Möslein
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_science_technology_law_journal
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shawn Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D. Grant, Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian Möslein, and Richard Williams, Company Law and
Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 135 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol9/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers,
Entrepreneurs, and Regulators
Authors

Shawn Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D. Grant, Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian Möslein, and Richard
Williams

This article is available in Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol9/iss2/1

Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A
Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and
Regulators
by SHAWN BAYERN, THOMAS BURRI, THOMAS D. GRANT, DANIEL M.
HÄUSERMANN, FLORIAN MÖSLEIN, AND RICHARD WILLIAMS*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 135
II. In the Company of Autonomous Systems: The American Limited
Liability Company and Beyond ...................................................... 136
A. The Memberless Limited Liability Company under German
Company Law ....................................................................... 139
B. Autonomously Operated Entities under Swiss Law ............... 143
C. Autonomous Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships
in the United Kingdom ........................................................... 149
III. The Implications of Legal Personality ............................................. 153
A. Constitutionality ..................................................................... 154
B. Informal Influence .................................................................. 156
C. At the Inception – Or at the End? ........................................... 157
D. The Reality of Control ............................................................ 159
IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 160

I. Introduction
In discussions of the regulation of autonomous systems, private law —
specifically, company law — has been neglected as a potential legal and
* Shawn Bayern: Larry & Joyce Beltz Professor, Florida State University College of Law;
Thomas Burri: Assistant professor of international law and European law at University of St.Gallen,
Switzerland; Thomas D. Grant: Senior Research Fellow, Wolfson College, University of
Cambridge; Daniel M. Häusermann: Dr. iur. (University of St. Gallen), LL.M. (Harvard), Private
Reader (Privatdozent) at University of St. Gallen; Florian Möslein: Professor of Private Law,
German and European Business Law at Philipps-University Marburg; Richard Williams: Hogan
Lovells University Lecturer in Corporate Law, University of Cambridge. The authors contributed
equally to the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the University of St. Gallen’s funding of a
workshop in Munich.
[135]

136

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:2

regulatory interface. As one of us has suggested previously,1 there are
several possibilities for the creation of company structures that might
provide functional and adaptive legal “housing” for advanced software,
various types of artificial intelligence, and other programmatic systems and
organizations — phenomena that we refer to here collectively as autonomous
systems, for ease of reference. In particular, this prior work introduces the
notion that an operating agreement or private entity constitution (such as a
corporation’s charter or a partnership’s operating agreement) can adopt, as
the acts of a legal entity, the state or actions of arbitrary physical systems.
We call this the algorithm-agreement equivalence principle.2 Given this
principle and the present capacities existing forms of legal entities,
companies of various kinds can serve as a mechanism through which
autonomous systems might engage with the legal system.
This paper considers the implications of this possibility from a
comparative and international perspective. Our goal is to suggest how, under
U.S., German, Swiss, and U.K. law, company law might furnish the
functional and adaptive legal “housing” for an autonomous system — and,
in turn, we aim to inform systems designers, regulators, and others who are
interested in, encouraged by, or alarmed at the possibility that an autonomous
system may “inhabit” a company and thereby gain some of the incidents of
legal personality. We do not aim here to be normative. Instead, the paper
lays out a template suggesting how existing laws might provide a potentially
unexpected regulatory framework for autonomous systems, and to explore
some legal consequences of this possibility. We do suggest that these
considerations might spur others to consider the relevant provisions of their
own national laws with a view to locating similar legal “spaces” that
autonomous systems could “inhabit.”

II. In the Company of Autonomous Systems: The American
Limited Liability Company and Beyond
To frame the discussion, we consider two examples that are either
possible under current technology or may become at least partly possible
within a decade or two:
1. Self-managed, rule-bound online commercial services. As purely
online services, such as “cloud storage” for file hosting or “cloud computing”

1. Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of
Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015) [hereinafter “Business Entities and
Autonomous Systems”]; Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the
Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1495–1500 (2014).
2. Cf. Bayern, supra note 1, at 99.
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for scalable distributed processing, increase in complexity and economic
importance, a market niche may be filled by online services that operate
independently and are managed purely by algorithmic rule-sets. Putting
aside for the moment questions about who would set up such systems or
profit from them, it is conceptually straightforward to imagine an automated
cloud-storage service that accepts online payment (perhaps in the form of
cryptocurrency) through a standardized automated interface, uses this
payment to reserve and maintain storage from a collection of back-end
providers like Amazon or Oracle, and provides automated customer-service
functions such as file retrieval and metadata management. The contracts
between the service and its customers are drafted entirely in terms of the
capabilities and limitations of the algorithms that operate the service; for
example, customers may pay for a particular set of virtual services specified
by a formal set of rules and implemented in software by the online provider.
2. Perpetual autonomous foundation. In 1996, internet entrepreneur
and activist Brewster Kahle established the Internet Archive, which
replicates and aims to preserve large amounts of diverse data, much like a
classical library. The Internet Archive, accessible at archive.org, stores
among other things time-stamped snapshots of the evolving web, collections
of music and books, and so on. The organization has been run largely as a
traditional nonprofit, both functionally and legally — that is, it has a board
and officers and employees — but consider a close analogue of this
organization: Suppose a wealthy founder like Kahle decides to implement in
software a long-term archival tool that is meant to store data perpetually.
Suppose that, either to achieve redundancy in data replication and
preservation or because at some point software may seem a more reliable
tool than a traditional nonprofit foundation, this founder desires to establish
a perpetual, autonomous foundation that captures and preserves information.
The founder does not want to employ, and perhaps does not trust, individual
people to manage the perpetual mission of the organization; instead, the
founder wishes to commit certain resources to the organization’s software
initially and then permit the software to act in an economically, functionally,
and perhaps legally autonomous manner. Alternatively, imagine a founder
who wishes to set up a grant-making nonprofit that relies exclusively on
formally determined, crowd-based decisions to determine the recipients of
grants.
We take no specific normative position on the social desirability of
these possible arrangements. We do conjecture that some actors may desire
them and, if seeking to realize such arrangements, will need their legal
consequences to be clarified. We also recognize that regulators and
policymakers may wish to encourage, to oppose, or to channel these
possibilities for various ends.
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As one of us has previously suggested, speaking purely as a matter of
positive law, modern business-entity law in the U.S. would appear to permit
either of the two examples above — and indeed essentially any arbitrary
configuration of software, rules, or ordered physical states — to achieve a
functional equivalent of legal personhood. What this means in practice is
that the software-driven commercial service, perpetual foundation, or similar
arrangement could, under present U.S. law, interact with the legal system in
the manner that familiar entities normally interact: make contracts, own
property, be a legal principal, be a legal agent, file a lawsuit (possibly with
the help of a legal agent), be sued, etc. Constitutional rights in the U.S. for
legal entities are the subject of significant debate, but at least these private
rights seem available under U.S. law.
In the US, the mechanism to achieve legal independence for an
autonomous entity arises primarily under Limited Liability Company (LLC)
law, mainly because such law is extremely flexible. The very point of
modern LLCs appears to be to give legal entity status to any arrangement
that has an operating agreement. Because an “operating agreement” can
essentially defer to the rules embodied in software, the autonomous
commercial service and the autonomous foundation in our examples might
use the LLC form. State LLC statutes often do not permit or envision this
particular type of independent entity, but previous work by one of the present
authors has suggested some relatively straightforward steps to create
autonomous LLCs. In particular:
(1) an individual member creates a member-managed LLC, filing the
appropriate paperwork with the state; (2) the individual (along,
possibly, with the LLC, which is controlled by the sole member)
enters into an operating agreement governing the conduct of the LLC;
(3) the operating agreement specifies that the LLC will take actions
as determined by an autonomous system, specifying terms or
conditions as appropriate to achieve the autonomous system’s legal
goals; (4) the individual transfers ownership of any relevant physical
apparatus of the autonomous system to the LLC; (5) the sole member
withdraws from the LLC, leaving the LLC without any members.
The result is potentially a perpetual LLC — a new legal person —
that requires no ongoing intervention from any preexisting legal
person in order to maintain its status.3

3. Shawn Bayern, The Implication of Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous
Systems, 7 EUR. J. RISK REGULATION 297, 303 (2016).
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As previously suggested, existing partnership law would appear to
allow such steps. Given the flexibility of the law in this area, the U.S.
approach raises an interesting possibility: In most cases, any arrangement
can establish “legal person” status in the US; sophisticated philosophical or
technical analysis of autonomous systems would not be necessary. As a
result, in the spirit of the evolving common law of commerce, U.S. law is
potentially quite adaptive to business realities, although of course its current
state may well be too flexible for those who wish autonomous legal entities
to be restricted.
Very broadly speaking, the laws of other major countries provide for
similar ways for memberless entities controlled by autonomous systems to
interact with the existing legal system, although most legal systems are
currently less open-ended than the LLC acts of U.S. states and, in many cases,
their restrictions and conceptions of entities raise particular issues for the
creation and channeling of autonomous entities. The three subsections below
consider the potential status of memberless entities managed by autonomous
systems in (A) Germany, (B) Switzerland, and (C) the United Kingdom.
A. The Memberless Limited Liability Company under German Company
Law

Under German law, the legal form of limited liability companies
(Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, typically abbreviated GmbH)
promises an interesting option for autonomous systems to inhabit. Germany
indeed prides itself for being the original birthplace of such companies, since
they were already introduced in 1892 by a specific code4 and have spread all
over the world since then.5 Moreover, the German academic debate about
the concept of limited liability and separate legal personality has been
particularly rich ever since Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s and Otto von
Gierke’s
famous
debate
about
legal
personhood
(‘reale
6
Verbandspersönlichkeit’). More recently, there has also been an intensive
academic debate among legal philosophers7 and also among constitutional

4. Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung [GmbH] [Limited
Liability Companies Act], Apr. 20, 1892, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] at 477 (Ger).
5. See, e.g., Jan Thiessen, Transfer von GmbH-Recht im 20 Jahrhundert – Export, Import,
Binnenhandel, RECHTSTRANSFER IN DER GESCHICHTE: LEGAL TRANSFER IN HISTORY 446
(Vanessa Duss et al. eds., 2006).
6. Compare Friedrich Karl von Savigny, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS, §§
60, 85 (1840), with OTTO FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, DAS WESEN DER MENSCHLICHEN VERBÄNDE
23 (1902).
7. Gunter Teubner, Elektronische Agenten und große Menschenaffen: Zur Ausweitung des
Akteursstatus in Recht und Politik, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 5 (2006); MalteChristian Gruber, Was spricht gegen Maschinenrechte?, AUTONOME AUTOMATEN 191 (Jochen
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lawyers8 as to whether the legal system should or could attribute legal
personality to autonomous systems that can act, learn and communicate on a
self-referential basis.
Surprisingly, however, those two strands of discussion so far have not
been brought together. As far as we are aware, there is no discussion under
current, positive company law yet as to whether or not a GmbH can provide
legal housing for autonomous systems.9 Yet, due to the flexible and enabling
character of its legal form, it seems plausible that the “legal homunculus of
genius design” — as the GmbH was once called10 — could effectively
provide autonomous systems with legal personality.
In particular, the possibility to form single-member limited liability
companies (“Ein-Mann-GmbH”) could pave the way for such creatures. In
German law, that possibility was introduced in 1980 and allows for the
formation and existence of limited liability companies with only one
member.11 Despite initial conceptual criticism — mainly concerning the
contractual nature of companies — the single-member limited liability
company is widely accepted today. As its name implies, however, it still
requires at least one member, and unlike in American LLC law,12 that
member needs to be a natural — not an artificial — person. Accordingly, §
1 of the German Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) states that “a
company with limited liability (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung,
GmbH) may be formed by one person or several persons pursuant to the
provisions of this Act for any purpose permitted by law” (emphasis added).
As a consequence, the formation of a company without any such person is
precluded. This preclusion, however, does not prevent an existing singleBung & Sascha Ziemann eds., 2015); cf. Lothar Philipps, Gibt es ein Recht auch für ein Volk von
künstlichen Wesen, wenn sie nur Verstand haben?, JENSEITS DES FUNKTIONALISMUS: ARTHUR
KAUFMANN ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 119, 119–26 (1989).
8. E.g., Jens Kersten, Menschen und Maschinen, 70 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 1, 6 (Jan. 2015)
(in favor of such possibility); cf. HANS PETER BULL, Sinn und Unsinn des Datenschutzes, MOHR
SIEBECK 120 (2015) (strictly opposing).
9. Very recently from a company law perspective, however, but again largely as a normative
claim, Jan-Erik Schirmer, Rechtsfähige Roboter?, 71 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 660 (July 2016).
10. Wolfgang Zöllner, 100 Jahre GmbH - Überlegungen zu Grundfragen des GmbH-Rechts
aus Anlaß ihres Jubiläums, 47 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 381 (1992).
11. More extensively, see, e.g., Karl-Heinz Fezer, Die Einmanngründung der GmbH,
JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 608–18 (1981); Werner Flume, Die GmbH-Einmanngründung, 146
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZHR) 205 (1982);
Peter Ulmer, Die Einmanngründung der GmbH – ein Danaergeschenk?, in BETRIEBS-BERATER
(BB), 1001 (1980); see also HEINZ-G. TRÖSTER, DIE EINMANN-GMBH – EIN BEITRAG ZUR LEHRE
VON DER RELATIVITÄT DER RECHTSPERSÖNLICHKEIT (1971).
12. See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. Law § 701(a)(4) (1999) (referring to a temporary memberless
period of “one hundred eighty days” but permitting the LLC to remain memberless for any “other
period as is provided for in the operating agreement”).
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member limited liability company to “lose” its only member, for example by
an acquisition of its own shares, by testamentary succession, or by a
forfeiture or redemption of its shares.13 As a consequence, the existing
GmbH would potentially transform into a memberless company — that is, a
company without any natural persons as members,14 but which could well
serve as a shell for an autonomous system.
So far, such memberless limited liability companies (“Kein-MannGmbH”) have not had much significance in practice. Nonetheless, their
potential existence has been subject of academic debate ever since Max
Hachenburg published an article on that topic in 1915.15 Nowadays the topic
is regarded as a “dogmatic touchstone of German corporate law.”16 We will
see, however, that the arguments of this old debate acquire renewed salience
once we add autonomous systems to the picture.
Basically, there are three or four different dogmatic positions with
respect to memberless limited liability companies in Germany.17 Some
argue that such entities are strictly illegal and that every legal act that may
lead to their creation — for example, the acquisition of a company’s own
shares — must itself be void because it aims at an impossible legal
consequence.18 However, acts that have a memberless GmbH as a
consequence may well rest on legitimate reasons, and sometimes these acts
may even be mandated by the law itself — for example in inheritance cases
where the company succeeds its only member as the owner of its shares.19

13. See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Comment on § 1, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG
para. 80 (2nd ed. 2015).
14. Extensively discussed by various monographs, cf. ARND BRETSCHNEIDER, DIE
GESELLSCHAFTERLOSE GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (1st ed. 1994); DIRK
OLDENBURG, DIE KEINMANN-GMBH – EIN UNMÖGLICHES RECHTSGEBILDE? (1985); ALFRED
PAULICK, DIE GMBH OHNE GESELLSCHAFTER (1979); HEINO RÜCK, DIE KEINMANNGESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRÄNKTER HAFTUNG (1994).
15. Max Hachenburg, Zum Erwerbe eigener Geschäftsanteile durch die Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung, FESTSCHRIFT FOR COHN 79 (1915).
16. Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 81.
17. See Rolf Steding, Die gesellschafterlose GmbH – eine rechtlich zulässige
Unternehmensvariante?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (NZG) 57, 60 (2003);
Olaf Sosnitza, Comment on § 33, GMBH-GESETZ para. 53 (Lutz Michalski ed., 2nd ed. 2010);
Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 81.
18. Karl Becker, Der Erwerb eigener Geschäftsanteile der GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU
(GmbHR) 700, 704 (1938); Wolfgang Hösel, Eigene Geschäftsanteile der GmbH, DEUTSCHE
NOTAR-ZEITSCHRIFT (DNotZ) 5, 7 (1958). See also Friedrich Buchwald, Der eigene Anteil der
GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU (GmbHR) 169, 171 (1958); Karl Winkler, Der Erwerb eigener
Geschäftsanteile durch die GmbH, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU (GmbHR) 73, 77 (1972) (with respect to
the voidance of such legal acts in particular).
19. See, e.g., KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 995 (4th ed. 2002); PAULICK,
supra note 15, at 92–105.
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Other authors argue that the existence of memberless limited liability
companies is possible, even on a permanent basis. For example, Max
Hachenburg claimed that the shell of a corporation may well persist
indefinitely despite its loss of members.20 The prevailing opinion takes a
middle course and holds that memberless limited liability companies can
indeed exist, but only during a transitional period before the company is
ultimately dissolved.
Among the advocates of this middle position, two different views can
be distinguished. Some argue that the dissolution of the company starts
automatically once it has been transformed into a memberless company and
that continuation of the company requires the passing of a specific
resolution.21 Others argue in favor of a mere duty to start dissolution
proceedings by appointment of a temporary executive director.22 These two
positions contrast (1) an opt-out from automatic dissolution with (2) an optin to dissolution. Two principal arguments are brought forward in favor of
automatic dissolution with opt-out — first, that automatic dissolution
clarifies the point in time when dissolution begins, and second, that only
automatic dissolution avoids the question of the permissible timeframe for
the existence of the memberless company.23
Much more fundamental, however — and much more important with
respect to autonomous systems — are the core arguments that are brought
forward against the (permanent) existence of memberless companies. From
a doctrinal — and somewhat circular — perspective, the possibility of such
companies would conflict with the nature of “membership” companies as
those that have members.24 More formally, such companies might also
enable an evasion of the law of foundations.25 A further argument concerns
the essential core of memberless companies: such companies lack a

20. Max Hachenburg, Zum Erwerbe eigener Geschäftsanteile durch die Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung, FESTSCHRIFT FOR COHN 79, 88-91 (1915). See also BRETSCHNEIDER, supra
note 15, at 47–49 & 55; Peter Kreutz, Von der Einmann- zur “Keinmann”-GmbH, FESTSCHRIFT
FOR STIMPEL 379, 383–93 (1985).
21. E.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at 996; Sosnitza, supra note 18, at para. 54; JAN WILHELM,
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 259, para. 684 (3d ed. 2009).
22. Lutz Michalski, Comment on § 1, GMBH-GESETZ para. 62; PAULICK, supra note 15;
CHRISTINE WINDBICHLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 234, § 21 para. 40 (23d ed. 2013).
23. Cf. Fleischer, supra note 14, at para. 82; Sosnitza, supra note 18, at para. 54.
24. See, e.g., WERNER FLUME, DIE JURISTISCHE PERSON 187 (1983); SCHMIDT, supra note
20, at 995; WINDBICHLER, supra note 23 at para. 40; contra Kreutz, supra note 21, at 385.
25. SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at 996; Steding, supra note 18; contra BRETSCHNEIDER, supra
note 15, at 34–36; Kreutz, supra note 21, at 385.
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functioning decision-making body.26 The idea behind this argument is that
organizations must at least be able to make decisions in order to be bestowed
with legal personhood. While this idea seems plausible in principle, the
argument loses much of its force once we consider autonomous systems,
because it is precisely a core feature of such systems that they are able to
take decisions independently of a governing group of human beings.
Algorithms can take ‘decisions’ based on a finite set of if-then-rules, and
artificial intelligence even allows for self-referential learning and truly
‘autonomous’ decision-making.
The dogmatic debate about memberless limited companies has shown
that the main consideration against the existence of such companies is that
they lack a decision-making body. Yet autonomous systems can (or will
someday be able to) take decisions themselves, so that they could serve as a
means to overcome this core deficit of memberless limited companies. By
the same token, such a company could serve as an important legal tool for
those autonomous systems and provide them with the shell of a legal person.
That shell would ultimately confer legal personhood to autonomous systems
under German law. What seems more problematic, however, is whether
autonomous systems could also direct the legal person, because § 6 para 2
GmbHG allows only natural persons to act as directors of a LLC. That
provision is challenged on constitutional grounds, however, but it is difficult
to predict whether the Constitutional Court will require legal persons also to
be permitted as LLC directors.27
In any event, German law — as that law currently exists — presents the
possibility of an autonomous system exercising some or all the elements of
legal personhood through the vehicle of a memberless limited liability
company.
B. Autonomously Operated Entities under Swiss Law28

In Switzerland, the question of whether, or to what extent, autonomous
systems can be given de facto legal personhood has not been addressed yet.

26. Buchwald, supra note 19; PETER KINDLER, GRUNDKURS HANDELS-UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT para. 106 (8th ed. 2016); WINDBICHLER, supra note 23.
27. In a recent decision, the German Constitutional Court decided that a similar provision did
not violate fundamental rights of legal persons, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG][Federal
Constitutional Court], NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] Jan. 12, 2016, 930, 2016
(Ger.). On potential consequences for § 6 para. 2 GmbHG cf. Markus Gehrlein, Leitung einer
juristischen Person durch juristische Personen?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
(NZG) 566 (2016).
28. The ideas expressed in this section are further elaborated in Daniel M. Häusermann,
Memberless Legal Entities Operated by Autonomous Systems – Some Thoughts on Shawn Bayern’s
Article ‘The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous
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Three Swiss legal entities look most promising in this regard — namely, the
stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft),29 the limited liability company or
LLC (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH),30 and the foundation
(Stiftung).31 Before each of these entities is discussed, a few observations
regarding the supreme governing body of such entities are in order.
All private law entities in Switzerland are required to have a supreme
governing body. Depending on the type of entity, the supreme governing
body may be a board of directors (in the case of a stock corporation), one or
several managing officers (in the case of an LLC), or a board of trustees (in
the case of a foundation).32 Only natural persons — that is, humans — are
eligible to be appointed to such body.33 In contrast, Swiss corporate law does
not prohibit legal entities from having an autonomous system take
management decisions on their behalf. Such an arrangement might,
however, come with a practical drawback. If the board of directors of a stock
corporation duly delegates management to (human) managers, directors will
be liable solely for breaches of their duty of care in selecting, instructing and
monitoring managers.34 The situation is similar with a foundation, but
unclear with an LLC.35 Swiss courts might deny this liability privilege to
directors who have delegated management to an autonomous system and, as
a result, directors may be liable for the system’s decisions as if they had taken
them themselves.36 In any case, the requirement to have a supreme governing
body consisting of humans is an important limitation to the possibility of
giving an autonomous system de facto legal personhood using a Swiss
private law entity.

Systems’ from a Swiss Law Perspective, U. ST. GALLEN LAW & ECON. (Working Paper No. 201606, Aug. 13, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2827504.
29. Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR], CODE DES OBLIGATION [CO], CODICE DELLE
OBLIGAZIONI [CO][CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 211, art. 620 (Switz.).
30. Id. art. 772.
31. Cf. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE
[CC] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 80 (Switz.).
32. Cf. OR art. 707(1), 809(2); ZGB art. 83-83a.
33. See OR art. 707(3), 809(2); HANDELSREGISTERVERORDNUNG [HREGV], ORDONNANCE
SUR LE REGISTRE DU COMMERCE [ORC], ORDINANZA SUL REGISTRO DI COMMERCIO
[ORC][COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE] Oct. 17, 2007, SR 221.411, art. 120 (Switz.).
34. OR art. 754(2).
35. See Harold Grüninger, Art. 83, BASLER KOMMENTAR ZIVILGESETZBUCH I N 11a, N 19
(Heinrich Honsell, Nedim Peter Vogt & Thomas Geiser eds., 4th ed., Basel 2010), (with regard to
foundations); Dieter Gericke & Stefan Waller, Art. 827, BASLER KOMMENTAR
OBLIGATIONENRECHT II N 8 (Heinrich Honsell, Nedim Peter Vogt & Rolf Watter eds., 4th ed.,
Basel 2012), (with regard to LLCs).
36. But see OR art. 754(2).
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A Swiss stock corporation may be formed for any lawful (for-profit or
not-for-profit) purpose37 by one or more legal or natural person.38 Contrary
to the situation in Germany (see above subsection A) it is clear under Swiss
law that a corporation must not own all of its own shares and thus become a
memberless entity.39 The reasons for this are mainly structural. A
corporation may not vote its own shares; so if there were no shareholders
other than the company, nobody could vote at the shareholders’ meetings to
be held annually.40 The same reasoning applies in the case of circular
ownership structures where a direct or indirect subsidiary of a corporation
holds 100% of the shares of its parent.41
Furthermore, a Swiss stock corporation is required to have a board of
directors comprising at least one director.42 Only natural persons may be
appointed as directors.43 The board of directors has certain mandatory
responsibilities, such as the supreme oversight of the corporation. These
responsibilities cannot be waived or assigned to another body or entity,44
whereas, if certain formalities are observed, the board may delegate the
management of the corporation to one or several directors, other individuals
or a management company.45 When the board has unlawfully delegated
authority, the directors can be held liable for the actions of the persons to
whom they (unlawfully) delegated authority as if they had performed them
themselves.46 As explained, Swiss courts might not accept a delegation to

37. See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Art. 620 at N 2. See also OR art. 620(3).
38. Cf. OR art. 625.
39. See, e.g., PETER BÖCKLI, SCHWEIZER AKTIENRECHT § 1 N 62 (4th ed., Zurich 2009) and
the references therein cited. Some scholars believe that corporations may hold all of their own
shares on a temporary basis.
40. See OR art. 659a(1) and 699(2). A further impediment to a repurchase of all shares
against consideration is that a repurchase of more than 10% (and in certain limited cases more than
20%) of the company’s share capital by the company is impermissible (even though sanctions are
limited). See also OR art. 659.
41. See OR art. 659b(1).
42. See OR art. 707(1).
43. See OR art. 707(3); HREGV art. 120.
44. See OR art. 716a(1).
45. A delegation of management to a legal entity is permissible except for the mandatory
responsibilities of the board of directors. See TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL [TF] [Federal Supreme Court]
Oct. 13, 2011, 137 ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL SUISSE (RECEUIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] III 503,
509–510 (Switz.). Additional restrictions apply to listed companies, see VERORDNUNG GEGEN
ÜBERMÄSSIGE VERGÜTUNGEN BEI BÖRSENKOTIERTEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN [VEGÜV]
[ORDINANCE AGAINST EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION IN LISTED STOCK COMPANIES] Nov. 20, 2013,
SR 221.331, art. 6 (Switz.).
46. But see OR art. 754(2).
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an autonomous system as lawful.47 While the system’s actions on behalf of
the company would not be void or illegal, the director would bear the liability
risk associated with unlawful delegation. To mitigate that risk, the
shareholder of the autonomously operating corporation could agree to
indemnify the corporation’s director with respect to any claims that may be
raised against him in connection with his activity — or, rather, passivity —
as a director.48
To summarize, an autonomous system cannot be given de facto legal
personhood without human involvement by means of a Swiss stock
corporation. The corporation must have at least one shareholder and at least
one natural person acting as director. This notwithstanding, an autonomous
system could operate the company’s business. De facto, though not de jure,
the autonomous system could even take the actions that are reserved to a
director, provided that a director can be found who is comfortable with this
setup — for example, because he or she is properly indemnified by the
company’s shareholder(s).
Basically the same applies mutatis mutandis to Swiss limited liability
companies (LLCs). An LLC may be formed for any lawful (for profit or not
for profit) purpose49 and must have at least one member. An LLC cannot
lawfully acquire, either directly or via a subsidiary, 100% of its own capital.50
A Swiss LLC must have at least one managing officer; managing officers
must be natural persons.51 While the managing officers of an LLC have
similar mandatory responsibilities as the board of directors of a stock
corporation,52 it is not court-tested whether a managing officer of an LLC
would benefit from the same liability privilege as a director of a stock
corporation53 if he or she delegated day-to-day management to other
individuals or a management company.54 In addition, “delegation” of all
decision-making to an autonomous system may give rise to a similar liability
risk as with directors of stock corporations. Thus, a Swiss LLC is no more

47.
48.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Indemnification by the company itself is only permissible to a limited extent. See, e.g.,
BÖCKLI, supra note 40, at § 13 N 861. The details are disputed in doctrine. See id.
49. See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Alexander Göbel & Philipp Speitler, Art. 772, supra note
37, at N 38.
50. See OR art. 783(1)-(2), 659b(1) in conjunction with 783(4).
51. See OR art. 809(2).
52. See OR art. 810(2). A notable difference is that the articles of association may reserve
the approval of certain matters by the company’s members. See OR art. 811.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 38.
54. See Dieter Gericke & Stefan Waller, Art. 827, supra note 37, at N 8 (most legal scholars
believe that the liability privilege would not be applicable).
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and no less suitable for giving de facto legal personhood to an autonomous
system than a stock corporation.
In contrast, private foundations organized under Swiss law may have
interesting characteristics for autonomous systems. While Swiss stock
corporations and LLCs by definition have members,55 Swiss private law
foundations cannot have members. A foundation is an estate that a settlor
dedicates to a given purpose; it is thus always a memberless legal entity.56 A
foundation must have a supreme governing body, usually called board of
trustees (Stiftungsrat), which oversees the foundation’s operations.57 Only
natural persons may become members of the board of trustees.58 The Swiss
government requires a board of trustees to have at least three members.59 In
addition, Swiss foundations (putting aside certain exceptions not relevant here)
are under permanent oversight by a governmental authority.60
Foundations must not seek profit for profit’s own sake, but they are
allowed to hold or operate a business.61 The range of permissible purposes
of foundations is limited, the most important being purposes of charity
(charitable foundations), well being of family members (family
foundations), and provision of occupational benefits (pension foundations).62
A foundation’s purpose must be stated in its objects clause and is considered
to be the foundation’s heart and soul.63 The beneficiaries of a foundation,
who by definition are legal or natural persons, are either defined explicitly
in the objects clause or have to be derived from the purpose.64 Beneficiaries
do not have to be identified specifically; the general public may be a
beneficiary, as for example when a foundation’s purpose is to maintain a
public garden.65 A foundation’s purpose may also be to preserve and foster

55. See, e.g., ARTHUR MEIER-HAYOZ & PETER FORSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERISCHES
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT § 2 N 52 (11th ed., Berne 2012).
56. Id. at N 53. See also ZGB art. 80.
57. Cf. ZGB art. 83; Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 3.
58. HREGV art. 120. This rule is subject to dispute in doctrine. See, e.g., Grüninger, supra
note 36, at N 5.
59. EIDGENÖSSISCHES DEPARTEMENT DES INNERN EDI, LEITFADEN FÜR STIFTUNGEN
GEMÄSS ART. 80 FF. [ZGB], § 10.1 (Nov. 2010), https://www.edi.admin.ch/edi/de/home/
fachstellen/eidgenoessische-stiftungsaufsicht/leitfaden-fuer-stiftungen.html.
60. See ZGB art. 84.
61. See Bundesgericht [BGer] May 18, 2001, 127 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTS
(AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG) [BGE] III 337 cons. 2b-2c (Switz.); Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 15.
62. See ZGB art. 87(1) and 89a; Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 1.
63. See Grüninger, supra note 36, at N 12 and references cited therein.
64. See Hans Michael Riemer, Art. 80, DAS PERSONENRECHT (BERNER KOMMENTAR ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN PRIVATRECHT) N 37 (3rd ed., Berne 1981).
65. Id.
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the business that it operates (so-called enterprise foundation).66 In that case,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court assumes that all stakeholders of the
business are the foundation’s beneficiaries.67
Whether owning and operating an autonomous system would be a
lawful purpose for a Swiss foundation depends on what that system would
do. An autonomous system working for the benefit of certain beneficiaries
or the general public, by for example providing services on a not-for-profit
basis, seems compatible with Swiss law. However, authorities68 may require
that the activities the system is to engage in be specified in the foundation’s
objects clause. If the autonomous system were to operate for its own sake
(i.e., without benefitting anyone or anything, other than the autonomous
system), the matter would become trickier. On the one hand, a foundation
may undoubtedly pursue eccentric or bizarre purposes, provided that it stays
within the limits of public morals.69 From this perspective, giving de facto
legal personhood to an autonomous system may be a permissible purpose.
On the other hand, a foundation whose sole purpose is to operate an
autonomous system arguably would not benefit anyone, not even the general
public, and may therefore be impermissible due to a lack of beneficiaries.
However, in general, it seems possible to define a foundation’s purpose in a
way that is legally valid and achieves the goal of giving legal independence
to an autonomous system.
The two examples given in Part I — a business-like service that benefits
its users, or a perpetual organization with a specified public mission —
would embody permissible purposes under Swiss foundation law. The test
of a foundation’s public purpose by the authorities may thus serve as a
functional regulatory barrier in Switzerland, whereas the generalized and
somewhat formal understanding of the “purpose” of LLCs under U.S. law
establishes no such restriction. In addition, while under Swiss foundation
law it seems generally possible to establish a foundation whose purpose is to
house an autonomous system, the requirement of having a board of trustees
composed of humans cannot be dispensed with. Such a foundation would
also be under permanent government oversight.

66. See BGer, supra note 62.
67. See Bundesgericht [BGer], May 18, 2001, docket no. 5C.9/2001, (not published in 127
BGE III 337), cons. 3e/bb.
68. The cantonal COMMERCIAL REGISTER reviews the deed of foundation before its
registration, cf. OR art. 940.
69. See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 65, at N 61; Id. Art. 84, at N 48.
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C. Autonomous Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships in the
United Kingdom

United Kingdom law offers two principal business entities that are
relevant to the ability of nonhuman autonomous systems to imitate legal
personhood. Those forms are the company70 and the Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP).71
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has, broadly speaking, a unified set of rules
regarding the company form. All companies in U.K. law, save those
incorporated by Royal Charter or specific Act of Parliament, are formed
under and governed by the provisions of the Companies Act 2006 and its
predecessors. Within the Act different types of company are permitted. The
principal division is between “public” and “private.” Private companies are,
as their name suggests, not permitted to offer their shares for sale to the
public,72 but they are not subject to any minimal capital requirement.
Public companies must have at least two directors and private
companies at least one director.73 In both cases, however, at least one
director of the company must be a natural person.74 The Act currently
permits corporate directors to hold office in a company as additional
directors, but this rule is unlikely to endure. The U.K. Parliament passed
legislation in 201575 to amend the Act to ban corporate directors outright,76
though the amendments to the Act have not yet been brought into force.
Nonetheless, even the current requirement to have at least one director who
is a natural person prevents a nonhuman autonomous system from
exclusively inhabiting the corporate form in any way that could approximate
to or imitate legal personhood.
Limited liability partnerships (LLPs), on the other hand, are a relatively
recent innovation in UK law, and they afford greater scope for autonomous
systems to interact with the legal system without direct human involvement.
The LLP form allows the partnership to benefit from separate legal
personality and limited liability without adopting the traditional structure of
a company. Accordingly, the LLP is something of a hybrid between a private
company and a general English partnership.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Incorporated under the Companies Act, 2006 (U.K.).
Incorporated under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act, 2000 (U.K.).
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 755 (U.K.).
Id. § 154.
Id. §§ 154-55.
Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26, § 87 (U.K.).
Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 156A (U.K.); exceptions may be provided under § 156B.
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At the heart of the LLP regime is respect for the autonomy of the
members of the LLP to organize its affairs through their “membership
agreement.”77 LLPs are, for example, not required to have a board of
directors separate from the members and so members are free to structure
governance arrangements as they wish. Deference to autonomy of the
members of an LLP also finds expression in the lack of any requirement for
LLP membership agreements to be publicly registered and disclosed (unlike
the constitutional “articles of association” of companies78) or indeed, any
requirement that membership agreements be written down.79 LLP
agreements are, in essence, treated like contracts80 and are construed in
accordance with normal rules of contractual interpretation.81
Certain rules are set out in the LLP Act that identify LLPs closely with
their members. Each member of an LLP is, for example, designated by the
LLP Act82 as an agent of the LLP (subject to restrictions on authority that the
members may adopt in the LLP agreement). The Act also requires LLPs to
have a minimum of two members.83 Potentially relevant to the search for a
legal housing for an autonomous system, the members of the LLP may be
natural or legal persons.84
The flexibility that characterizes the LLP in U.K. law offers two
potential ways in which an autonomous system could interact with the legal
system with no direct human intervention. The first could be termed a “soft”
arrangement whereby an LLP is formed by two corporate members who then
adopt the acts of an autonomous system as the acts of the LLP in their LLP
agreement on the basis of the algorithm-agreement equivalence principle.85
The first step in this process should be uncontroversial. The second step —
that is, adoption of the acts of an autonomous system as the acts of the LLP
— is novel, but there is nothing in principle that should prevent such an
agreement from being concluded given the contractual nature of LLP
agreements and the general emphasis on respect for party autonomy that is
at the heart of the LLP regime. Of course, the commercial sustainability of
an LLP adopting the acts of an autonomous system would be conditional on

77. Limited Liability Partnerships Act, c. 12, § 5(1) (U.K.).
78. Companies Act 2006, c.46, § 18(2) (U.K.).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Rowe v. Aries Film Partner 1 Ltd [2016] EWCH 1800 (Ch).
82. Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 6 (U.K.).
83. Id. § 2(1)(a).
84. JOHN WHITTAKER & JOHN MACHELL, LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS: THE NEW
LAW 9–10 (2001).
85. Id.
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the ability of an autonomous system to function in an effective commercial
manner. Assuming such technological ability, however, this arrangement
could allow an autonomous system to interact with other legal persons
directly without human intervention or agency.
The members of the LLP would, of course, retain a role in the
association under this arrangement and would be obliged to fulfill residual
statutory functions allocated to members, such as authenticating LLP
accounts and returns.86 Nonetheless, members could under this arrangement
withdraw from the day-to-day business of the company. And as the members
would themselves be corporate bodies, the association could legally function
within orthodox arrangements without human membership of the
organization.
Might it be possible to go even further and manipulate the LLP form so
as to leave the autonomous system to inhabit the LLP without the
involvement of any other legal person at all? This might be possible if the
members of an LLP were able to withdraw from the association, leaving the
autonomous system to inhabit its personality alone. This is the second, more
speculative, way in which an autonomous system might interact with the
legal system through the mechanism of an LLP, at least for a period of time.
As we have mentioned, the LLP Act sets a minimum membership
requirement of two members to create and operate an LLP.87 The LLP Act
imposes personal liability on any member who allows an LLP to operate for
more than six months with fewer than two members.88 But there is no explicit
rule that requires an LLP to cease its business if it has fewer than two
members, nor is there any provision for the automatic liquidation of such an
LLP.89 So if both members of an LLP withdrew from the LLP
simultaneously having previously concluded an agreement for the LLP to act
through an autonomous system, the LLP could, in theory at least, continue
to interact with the legal system effectively. And of course in such a situation
the personal liability provision in s. 4A of the LLP Act would have no effect
because, assuming simultaneous withdrawal, no single member would have
breached the provision.90
There is as such no formal statutory limitation on the period during
which an LLP could, in theory, operate without any members and, as such,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See, e.g., Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1911, Reg.12 (U.K.).
Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 2(1) (U.K.).
Id. § 4A(2).
WHITTAKER & MACHELL, supra note 85, at 60.
Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, c. 12, § 4A(2) (U.K.).

152

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:2

the U.K. LLP, much like the U.S. LLC,91 would seem to offer some prospect
for an autonomous system to exclusively inhabit an incorporated legal
person in a manner that would closely mimic legal personhood for the system
itself, at least for a period of time. Such an arrangement is, however, unlikely
to be stable. A key risk for an LLP without members would be a petition for
winding up by one of its creditors. The winding up of LLPs is governed by
the legislation for winding up companies92 in the Insolvency Act 1986 and a
‘memberless’ LLP, even if solvent, could be wound up under s. 122(1)(c) of
that Act93 on an application from a creditor or other contributory.94 Moreover,
a memberless LLP would be unable to comply with statutory accounting and
filing obligations95 that require the authentication of members,96 and persistent
default in filing could, eventually, result in the striking off of the LLP from the
register (effective liquidation) by the U.K. registrar of companies on the ground
of apparent inactivity.97
The techniques outlined here in respect of the ways in which an
autonomous system could inhabit the personality of a U.K. LLP and interact
with the legal system through it are, of course, speculative as a matter of
practical law (such approaches have to our knowledge not been the subject
of litigation), though it is hopefully clear that the most successful approach
is likely to be that which retains traditional membership of the LLP by at
least two members. More generally, U.K. courts have taken a pragmatic
approach to the development and use of corporate personalities in the past.
Going forward, this flexibility could readily accommodate technological
advances in artificial intelligence. We need think only of the seminal case
of Salomon v. Salomon,98 where the English courts recognized the separate
legal personality of the “one person” company without any apparent
difficulty, when it had been hitherto widely believed that the Companies Act
then in force had not intended to grant legal personality to such entities.
“Private” one-person companies were however a commercial fact that

91. Bayern, supra note 2.
92. Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1090, Reg. 5 (U.K.).
93. Id. sch. 3.
94. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 124 (U.K.).
95. The Limited Liability Partnerships (Accounts and Audit) (Application of Companies Act
2006) Regulations 2008, S.I. 2008/1911, Reg. 4 (U.K.) (applying accounting and auditing
provisions of the 2006 Act to LLPs).
96. See id. Reg. 12.
97. The Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of the Companies Act 2006) Regulations,
2009, S.I. 2009/1804, Reg. 50 (U.K.) (applying §§ 1000-1002 of the 2006 Act to LLPs).
98. Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
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developed through the latter half of the 19th century,99 and their recognition
as legal persons was reached without U.K. courts troubling themselves with
philosophical questions about the nature and validity of the legal personality
in “one-person” entities.100 Of course in the subsequent century there has
been a tendency to invest the Salomon decision with a certain economic
rationality on the basis that whilst the separate legal personhood of oneperson entities may be a “fiction,” it is an economically desirable fiction.
But that rationality was not the driving force behind the decision itself.
Our purpose in highlighting the pragmatic approach of U.K. law to
corporate legal personality here is therefore simply to point out that whilst
many practical and theoretical problems might be posed by granting legal
personhood to an autonomous system, U.K. law is likely to focus on practical
solutions and to this extent it is quite possible that the flexibility inherent in U.K.
corporate law develops in a manner that allows autonomous systems, as an
increasingly present commercial fact, to inhabit corporate forms in a way that
approximates to some form of legal personhood.

III. The Implications of Legal Personality
In our examination of whether legal entities under different legal orders
would be able to house an autonomous system, four horizontal issues arise.
First (section II.A), there are issues of constitutionality: Would the
constitutional jurisprudence of corporations apply to those inhabited by
autonomous systems? Second (section II.B), there are issues of functional
or effective influence: Even if an artificial intelligence never formally takes
over an organization, it might gain influence or control over it in practice;
what legal consequences might this have? Third (section II.C), there are
issues of how to deal with legal uncertainty in a transitory phase: when the
lex lata is applied to bestow legal personality upon an artificial intelligence,
rules normally governing a “transitory phase” are involved. Finally (section
II.D), we consider temporal issues: organizational rules may be eternalized
when an artificial intelligence is permanently hosted in an organization.

99. See e.g., REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE BOARD OF
TRADE TO INQUIRE WHAT AMENDMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE ACTS RELATING TO JOINT
STOCK COMPANIES INCORPORATED WITH LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862
TO 1890, 1895 [C. 7779], ¶ 12.
100. Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1450 (2006).
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A. Constitutionality

Does an autonomous system in an LLC organized under U.S. law, a noman’s GmbH in German law, a foundation governed by Swiss law, or an
LLP organized under British law hold constitutional rights? Imagine a state
expropriating property from a legal person, refusing to grant it a business
license, or prohibiting it from communicating a viewpoint. How does a court
respond to a personless organization asserting constitutional rights to defend
against such measures? The law could be read in (at least) three ways.
On one reading — perhaps a formalist one — the court would hold that
an autonomous system in an organization may invoke constitutional rights
merely by virtue of the organization’s status as a legal entity. On this view,
it does not matter who is within or behind the organization. Any legal person
should enjoy the constitutional rights developed in case law — e.g., the right
to own property — if only to facilitate doing business.101
On a less formalist reading of the rights of legal entities, constitutional
courts could give a different answer. On this view, an organization holds
constitutional rights only because natural persons act collectively through it.
Natural persons do not forfeit their rights solely because they act together.102

101. It is generally understood to be settled law in the Western world that regular legal persons
such as companies hold at least some constitutional rights. (The law is not settled with regard to
constitutional rights of companies based on public-private partnerships, however. See Peter Selmer,
§53: Zur Grundrechtsberechtigung von Mischunternehmen, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE
(HGR) II, 1255, 1255-1291 (2007).) Which rights specifically they hold is typically decided on
case-by-case basis. For the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, see Beatrice Weber-Dürler, §205:
Träger der Grundrechte, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE (HGR) II 79–99 (2007). The German
Constitution includes a general clause in article 19(3), see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I
(Ger.), which states that legal persons hold all fundamental rights which owing to their “nature”
(“Wesen”) lend themselves to being held by a legal person. Subsequent case law clarified the
nature of rights in this regard for each constitutional right. See Peter J. Tettinger, §51 Juristische
Personen des Privatrechts als Grundrechtsträger, HANDBUCH DER GRUNDRECHTE (HGR) II 1203–
1233 (2006). The European Court of Human Rights also applied a case-by-case approach with the
rights under the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union,
and the European Union’s foundational treaties. Both these courts, however, only implicitly decided
on the capacity of legal persons to hold rights, for instance by allowing companies to claim violation
of the right to own property. See Tettinger, supra, at 1229, N 71 and 73; see FACTSHEET–COMPANIES:
VICTIMS OR CULPRITS, EUR. CT.H.R. (July 2013) (for the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights as to companies), http://www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/FS_Companies_ENG.pdf. For the U.S.,
see Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What if Corporations Aren’t People?, 44 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 701, 705 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873158 (mentioning a “pattern of case-by-case
adjudication”).
102. See Shapiro & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 707 (“Corporations are useful legal fictions
composed of individuals who do not shed their own constitutional rights at the office-building
door.”) This reading lifts the “corporate veil,” which happens only exceptionally in corporate law.
See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 40, ¶ 57 (Feb. 5) (the corporate veil is lifted only “in exceptional circumstances”).
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Given that natural persons are absent when an autonomous system alone
inhabits an organization, on this view there would be no reason for the
organization to hold constitutional rights.
A third, pragmatic reading might occupy the middle ground. It would
differentiate among constitutional rights, recognizing that an autonomous
system in an organization holds certain rights — e.g., the right to property
— while other rights, typically those with a more “human touch,” remain out
of reach.103 Organizations inhabited by artificial intelligence could thus be
barred from claiming free speech in order to influence voters in elections.104
How and where to place the dividing line may well give rise to considerable
differences.
Which of the three approaches the law will take might depend upon when
the law comes to address the matter. Constitutional law might address
artificial intelligence in organizations at an earlier (i) or later stage (ii).
i) Constitutional law could preclude the formation of an organization
around an artificial intelligence in the first place, thus barring it from being
treated as a legal person.105 In continental legal orders like Germany, a
litigant might invoke human dignity to rule out a rights-holding autonomous
system, even if company law, taken in isolation, did not prohibit it.106 A
clear exclusion — a preemptive strike by constitutional judges against a
constitutional rights-holding artificial intelligence — is unlikely, however,

On lifting the corporate veil in the context of constitutional rights, see Thorsten Kingreen Florian
Möslein, Die Identität der juristischen Person: Die Hobby Lobby-Entscheidung des U.S. Supreme
Court zur Glaubensfreiheit gewinnorientierter Kapitalgeselschaften, JURISTEN ZEITUNG (JZ) 57
(2016).
103. Malte-Christian Gruber, Was spricht gegen Maschinenrechte?, AUTONOME AUTOMATEN.
KÜNSTLICHE ROBOTER UND ARTIFIZIELLE AGENTEN IN DER TECHNISIERTEN GESELLSCHAFT,
BEITRÄGE ZUR RECHTS-, GESELLSCHAFTS- UND KULTURKRITIK 191, 191–206 (Jochen Bung, Malte
Gruber & Sascha Ziemann eds., 2015), one might call this an act of “functionally awarded legal
personality” (‘“funktional zugeschrieben[e]” Rechtsfähigkeit’ (our translation)).
104. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). If
Citizens United were applied to a legal person hosting an artificial intelligence, it could rely on free
speech in the context of elections. On a somewhat different note, artificial intelligence could also
engage in hate speech. See, e.g., Teresa Sickert, Künstliche Intelligenz: Vom Hipster-Mädchen zum
Hitler-Bot, SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/microsofttwitter-bot-tay-vom-hipstermaedchen-zum-hitlerbot-a-1084038.html (describing how a Microsoft
chatbot chatted autonomously on the internet, but soon engaged in hate speech).
105. Note that constitutions regularly guarantee the right to found organizations. Founding an
organization in order to host an artificial intelligence is therefore an act protected by constitution. By
way of example, see the freedom to choose a corporate form, a right which is protected by the
economic freedom, which in turn is a fundamental right under the Swiss constitution. JÖRG PAUL
MÜLLER & MARKUS SCHEFER, GRUNDRECHTE IN DER SCHWEIZ, 1060 (4th. ed., 2008).
106. For a case where human dignity was at issue on the European level, see Case C-36/02,
Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt
Bonn 2004 E.C.R. I-9609 (concerning “laser sport”).
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because artificial intelligence (and autonomous systems generally) develop
gradually in small steps.
ii) Even if an organization hosting an autonomous system could
lawfully be brought into existence and hold constitutional rights, protection
for general public morals could intervene at a later stage. Protection of ordre
public or public policy is contained in some or another form in most
(probably all) constitutional orders. It is embodied in various international
instruments.107 In international humanitarian law, there is the catchall
concept of the “public conscience of mankind” (Martens Clause, 1899 Hague
Convention and its progeny). Conceivably, public morals could be invoked
to annul or otherwise limit the effect of specific conduct of an organization
hosting an artificial intelligence.
Finally, a government could itself establish an organization hosting an
autonomous system, for instance, in order to outsource public tasks and
services to it. Automated driving provides at least limited examples for
autonomous systems to enter into markets, and artificial intelligence may
soon steer public buses; much of tax assessment has been automated already
in many countries, so entrusting it to an artificial intelligence inhabiting its
own legal entity seems a plausible eventual step. Pressure to increase
productivity and save taxpayers’ money is already weighing in and forcing
the hands of human governments. However, do citizens have the right to be
driven by human chauffeurs or talk to human tax officials at any point?
Today, in many countries it is already difficult to reach a human in the
interaction with tax authorities. Lodging an artificial intelligence in an
organization with legal personality may extend the “computer loop,”
possibly attenuating the human operator’s role to the vanishing point. By
implication the question becomes urgent: do we need to define essential tasks
of the state that must be fulfilled by human beings under all circumstances?
B. Informal Influence

Constitutional law is one thing; reality is often another. Even though
the law may formally preclude an autonomous system from taking over an
organization, such a system could still gain influence over an entity or the
human beings running it. The concern is not necessarily that an artificial
intelligence might sneak up on the leadership of a company. Rather, the

107. E.g., United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V (2)(b), June 10, 1958; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, art. 34(2) (1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006). As to its widespread
inclusion in other instruments, see the observation of the Chairman of the drafting meetings for
UNCITRAL, noting that all thirty-eight conventions of the Hague Conference include it: Loewe
(Austria), UNCITRAL meetings, 318th mtg., 11 June 1985, para. 58, para. 45.
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manner in which the human decision-makers relate to an autonomous system
in their company is the matter to keep in mind. If an artificial intelligence
had qualities that the human decision-makers in a company found useful, it
could gain influence on their decision-making.
In a limited way, existing machines already exert influence: A board of
directors makes sure to keep engineers on the payroll who are needed to run
a machine that is necessary to carry out the company’s functions; they make
sure the electricity bills are paid to keep it running. One might say that that
machine is influencing the board. But that machine is not yet participating in
decision-making; it is not engaging in a discourse with the human beings
about their decisions.
An artificial intelligence in the future conceivably could do this,
however. Though legal corporate governance rules may make no provision
for an artificial intelligence to run a company — or may even preclude it —
the door would open to the artificial intelligence to exert influence. In this
case, one thing to watch for is the quality of the relationship between the
artificial intelligence and the human decision-makers. How often do the
human decision-makers turn to the artificial intelligence for analysis or for
answers to questions? What matters are they asking it to analyze, and what
sort of questions are they asking it to answer? How often do they invoke the
artificial intelligence’s input as justification for decisions? Reference to an
artificial intelligence could become deference when routine dulls the senses
— which is why a driver cannot always be expected to intervene in a system
that drives a car autonomously even in case of danger, and why doctors need
to be careful when they receive counsel from a machine. Similarly, decisionmakers in companies involving artificial intelligence may have to be careful.
The law of business organizations for a long time has been concerned with
the duty of care of the business manager; the introduction of an autonomous
system might simply be a new factual situation, which the existing law is
perfectly capable of addressing, but it may take more than one dispute to
figure out exactly how.
C. At the Inception – Or at the End?

Legal rules exist for the purpose of regulating the terminal phase of a
company, by allowing it to be wound up in an orderly manner; others govern
the transition towards new owners, such as heirs. Reflecting the purpose of
such rules, they do not apply for an indefinite period; their application is
transitory. Across national jurisdictions, the diversity of rules dealing with
the expiration of organizations and the deaths of persons is vast. However,
many such rules have one thing in common: they deal with the situation in
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which the human being who was once involved (whether directly or
indirectly) has left the scene.
Our legal systems, accordingly, are familiar with entities that have lost
their human participants. An actor who seeks to vest an autonomous system
with legal personality might look to the rules that exist to deal with entities
in that stage of their life cycle. We should not dismiss out of hand the
possibility that the existing rules in a particular legal system might be
adapted to accommodate an entity that is “personless” by design. The entity
continues to exercise the rights and observe the obligations that follow from
its prior recognition as a legal person. Creditors, for instance, can sue it —
the protection of creditors indeed being one of the main purposes of the rules
concerning the transitory phase of an organization. This is the state of affairs
that one would aim for if one’s goal were to give an autonomous system a
legal framework in which to interact with the world. That is, one would aim
to set up an organization from which the human participants have withdrawn,
but which retains the capacity to be a debtor, a creditor, and a contracting
party for whatever purpose. Extending the application of the transitory rules
to a new situation, the autonomous system would exercise rights and honor
obligations, as if human beings were still involved. The transitory rules
would be applied, in effect, to afford the autonomous system legal
personality, or at least enough of the functional incidents of legal personality
to be indistinguishable from it.
Using the transitory rules in this way would eventually raise significant
questions. Would an entity in its winding-up phase — including an
autonomous system with legal capacity — be able to enter into new
contracts, and if so to what extent? How well would the entity’s existing
legal relationships (i.e., the relationships established before the winding-up
procedure began) hold up? While positive company and insolvency law
generally answer these questions, issues specific to the artificially intelligent
organization are harder to tackle. Transitory rules might be a pathway for
the artificial intelligence to reach legal capacity, but this implies preserving
for an indefinite time a state of affairs that was intended to be temporary.
Most legal systems are past the point where, for example, inheritance law
once resulted in unsettled disputes giving a decedent’s estate a decades-long
twilight existence; and even Jarndyce v. Jarndyce eventually came to a close
— Dickensian spoiler alert! — because the estate ran out of money to pay
the lawyers.
Yet, in a world of emerging autonomous systems — a world in which
the lawyer’s creativity is no less than it was in generations past — legal rules
designed to deal with the terminal phases of entities and people merit
consideration. How long might a terminal phase be extended under those
rules? Should we think about time limits and, if so, what are the appropriate
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limits? Should a development that might have as much social and legal
impact as vesting legal personality in an artificial intelligence be based on
rules of transitory character designed to perform a very different function?
Beyond these fundamental questions, the legal rules concerning the terminal
phase of a legal entity should be a focus of consideration, as we watch for
the emergence of an autonomous-system-driven organization. In particular,
the application of those rules in practice should be watched. Legal rules
intended to address transitory situations have more than once been extended
indefinitely and thus been transformed into permanent arrangements — or at
least have lasted long enough to leave the human subjects of the law in a
state of perplexity.
D. The Reality of Control

It is inherent in the logic of hosting an autonomous system in a legal
entity that it works independently from the degree of intelligence the entity
possesses. The entity’s constitutional document simply refers to the “will”
or “decisions” — more abstractly, the arbitrary state — of the autonomous
system, regardless of how far advanced it is, and legal personality is
bestowed upon it as a consequence of organizational law.
This state of affairs may be easy to understand when the “housed”
autonomous system performs only simple, straightforward tasks. But the
considerations inevitably would become more complex, when the “housed”
system begins to think intelligently and begins to perform more complex
tasks — including the meta-task of deciding what tasks to perform, when,
and how. For the foreseeable future, artificial intelligence will not be
general, but rather specific and sectorial. Nor will it be independent from
humans. Instead it will be symbiotic with humans relying on their support
as they, in turn, will look to it for help. Humans and artificial intelligence
will be mutually dependent.
This raises two points with regard specifically to artificial intelligence
in an entity. First, circumstances might change. With an artificial
intelligence hosted in an entity from which all human participants have
withdrawn, a change in circumstances may become hard to accommodate.
How can the constitutional documents of an entity be changed when the
founders no longer have the power to intervene? Laying down the objective
of an organization for eternity is notoriously difficult. With the founders/
participants “out of the loop,” an organization hosting an artificial
intelligence may become immutable.
“Decentralized autonomous
organizations” linked to block chains have faced similar problems. When
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baked in block chain commands turn out to be unwise, someone must have
the power to change them — which stands in contradiction to their nature.108
Immutability leads to the second point. True to symbiosis, an artificial
intelligence looking to accommodate change will contract human help. Enter
the programmer. A programmer may gain significant influence over the
artificial intelligence. In fact, the programmer may be the only one having
any influence over it, if only by doing a good — or bad — job of reprogramming. However, like managers, programmers have no formal role
in decision-making in an organization, despite their effective impact. Thus
the gap between the law and reality widens.

IV. Conclusion
Where would a creative entrepreneur house an autonomous system so
as to render it maximally capable of interacting with the legal order? None
of the organizations we scrutinized matches the flexibility of the U.S. limited
liability company (LLC). For the German equivalent, the Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung, German scholarship is generally skeptical whether it
can exist as a personless company, a “Kein-Mann–GmbH.” While housing
an autonomous system in this form of German company is not categorically
excluded, a human member must be there to chaperone it.
The most flexible entity British law offers, the Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP), is at least theoretically capable of hosting an autonomous
system. It bestows legal personality like the U.S. LLC. Provided that both
members of a British LLP withdraw simultaneously, it continues to exist,
though it is uncertain for how long. More doubts thus linger under current
British than U.S. law.
A Swiss Stiftung (Foundation) seems well designed to host an
autonomous system, since it provides legal personhood to an estate devoted
to a specific purpose. Since there are few restrictions as to such purposes, it
generally seems possible to establish a Foundation whose purpose is to house
an autonomous system that engages in certain specified activities. Yet,
unlike the U.S. LLC, an autonomous system inhabiting a Foundation needs
collaborators on a permanent basis: The board of trustees must be humans
beings who, when they defer to the autonomous system, run the risk of being
held liable for the decisions that they implement.
The above options have given rise to certain concerns. Autonomous
systems housed in entities, for instance, may be able to claim constitutional

108. See Schumpeter, Not-so-clever Contracts, ECONOMIST (July 30, 2016), http://www.
economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-still-bette r-bet-coldhearted.
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rights. Is this desirable? The techniques developed above also put rules to
creative use that were designed solely to govern certain transitional phases
in the life cycle of organizations. Should creative entrepreneurs be allowed
to extend such transitional phases ad infinitum? Even if company law or
constitutional law heeded these concerns and denied autonomous systems
legal personhood, policy makers cannot afford to ignore more complex
transactional arrangements. For instance, autonomous systems could gain
practical influence over human managers and board members. Their sheer
usefulness could dull humans and make them complacent, leaving
autonomous systems de facto in charge of companies. Programmers might
then be alone in exercising real and meaningful influence over autonomous
systems and — by extension — over the companies that those systems
influence or control. However, current company law has little or nothing to
say about programmers or autonomous systems.
We conclude with a further possibility of interest to both entrepreneurs
and regulators: iIn today’s interconnected world, an entity registered in one
jurisdiction may qualify to “do business” in another. Thus, for example, a
U.S. LLC might operate in Germany. It is unclear the extent to which
jurisdictions will tolerate novel uses of existing foreign business forms.
Mutual recognition of business forms across national legal systems would
seem to assume familiarity with the forms — and with the functional
purposes for which the forms are employed. Harnessing company law to
house an autonomous system likely would attract challenges in the
jurisdictions where it is attempted — and in other jurisdictions where it might
have effects.

